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We propose a new methodology for predicting electoral results that com-
bines a fundamental model and national polls within an evidence synthesis
framework. Although novel, the methodology builds upon basic statistical
structures, largely modern analysis of variance type models, and it is carried
out in open-source software. The methodology is motivated by the spe-
cific challenges of forecasting elections with the participation of new political
parties, which is becoming increasingly common in the post-2008 European
panorama. Our methodology is also particularly useful for the allocation of
parliamentary seats, since the vast majority of available opinion polls pre-
dict at national level whereas seats are allocated at local level. We illustrate
the advantages of our approach relative to recent competing approaches us-
ing the 2015 Spanish Congressional Election. In general, the predictions of
our model outperform the alternative specifications, including hybrid models
that combine fundamental and polls’ models. Our forecasts are, in relative
terms, particularly accurate in predicting the seats obtained by each political
party.
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1. Introduction
Forecasting in social sciences is a challenging endeavour. Probably one of the most
challenging exercises in this respect is the forecasting of election results. Most of the
literature on election forecasting, including its methodological underpinning, has focused
on two-party political systems, a ”winner-take-all” system for the Electoral College and
democracies with a long history of past elections. Conversely, in this paper we develop a
methodology most appropriate for elections with little historical data for some competing
parties, including the case of parties entering the electoral competition for the first time.
Seats are allocated under a D’Hondt system. The vast majority of available opinion
polls predict at national level whereas the seats are allocated at local level.
The scientific approach to electoral forecasting relies mostly on four alternative method-
ologies: the statistical modelling approach based on fundamentals; the use of polls,
either voting intention surveys or party sympathy surveys; the use of political predic-
tion markets based on bets for the candidates; and a combination of other methods,
sometimes referred to as hybrid models1. The statistical modelling approach, also re-
ferred to as structural approach, consists of predicting election results from histori-
cal and socioeconomic data. An example is the simple ”bread and peace” model of
[Hibbs, 2008]2. In stable political systems it is known that national election votes are
highly predictable from fundamentals3 while polls are highly variable but contain useful
information, especially close to the election day. The aggregation of polls and the use of
betting markets are further classical approaches to electoral forecasting. Recently there
has been increasing interest in hybrid models which combine the outcomes of several
methods. The most popular hybrid approach is the synthesis of a fundamental model
and polls, e.g. [Lewis-Beck, 2005]. [Graefe, 2015] averages the results of pollsters, pre-
diction markets, experts (journalists and scholars) and quantitative models to produce a
combined forecast for the 2013 German election4. [Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville, 2016]
and [Lewis-Beck et al., 2016] present the canonical structure of this type of model. In
this case the fundamental model is a regression on GDP and government popularity.
This model is then synthesised with the median of polls, using a second regression, in
order to predict the national level result.
Our methodology is also hybrid but it is tailored to situations where there is little his-
torical data to apply existing hybrid methods. Moreover, elections are determined by
seats won at local level, hence the national average is not that predictive of the party’s
1Recently there have been attempts to use social media to predict elections. Using Twitter has been
found to be a poor forecasting strategy [Gayo-Avello, 2012]. [Murthy, 2015] shows that tweets are
more reactive than predictive. [Wang et al., 2015] uses a Xbox gaming platform to show a new
methodology to forecast elections in the context of highly non-representative survey data.
2There are recent examples of fundamental models used in the context of Spanish political elections.
For instance [Balaguer-Coll et al., 2015] show that an increase in local public spending increases the
likelihood of being reelected.
3For instance [Gelman and King, 1993].
4See [Graefe et al., 2014] for an application to the US elections.
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representation in the parliament. A further reality particularly relevant to the European
electoral landscape is that there is limited or no polling at local level. To put things
in perspective, after the beginning of the financial crisis many new parties were created
in European countries to capitalise on the discontent of voters with the policy reaction
to the economic crisis. [Dennison and Pardijs, 2016] identify 45 ”insurgent” parties in
Europe, many of them just a few years old, that occupy the entire political spectrum,
including the extremes. Insurgent parties held 1,329 seats in 27 EU countries in 2016,
which correspond to 18.3% of the total seats of their parliaments. The political landscape
in Spain is complicated by the existence of numerous political parties with non-trivial
representation in certain parts of the country (the so-called nationalist parties, e.g. in
Catalonia or the Basque country), the fact that only a handful of elections have taken
place since the restoration of democracy in the country in 1977 after decades of dictator-
ship, and that electoral polling is not as extensive as in older democracies (e.g. the USA
or the UK). Moreover, as in most countries, polling is rarely available at higher spatial
resolutions than national. However, by far the biggest challenge in the 2015 elections
is that two new political parties ended up taking more than 30% of the parliamentary
seats even though they had no political representation in the previous parliament. Ac-
cordingly, the Spanish case is a good example of the challenges of forecasting electoral
outcomes with new parties’ competition.
Our approach is to learn the national average for each party primarily from published
polls and use a fundamental model to learn how this national average propagates down
to local level. In order to compensate for the lack of historical data for some competing
parties, we use a fundamental model of voting intention trained on ”deep” micro-data
obtained in the form of pre-electoral surveys. In Spain, these are carried out by the
government-sponsored research centre CIS and allow us to estimate the relationship
between geographical or demographic characteristics and voters’ choice. The downside
of these data sets is that the sample size in some provinces is very low and that the sample
might not be representative. We address these issues through post-stratification5 based
on census data. This model is synthesised with a polls model, which computes weighted
averages of published polls but, at the same time, corrects for potential sources of bias.
These include house effects, the varying quality of polling methodologies, as well as time-
trending that takes place as the election times approaches. Due to the lack of historical
data the synthesis is not done by regression, but rather through a Bayesian evidence
synthesis approach.
It is easiest to understand what that approach amounts to in the following way: the
fundamental model produces simulations of local results for each party; these are trans-
formed to local seats using D’Hondt method; the local results are aggregated at national
level for each simulation; each of these simulations then receives a weight which corre-
sponds to how close the implied national average is to the prediction of the polls model;
then each implied national seat allocation is given the corresponding weight and weighted
averages are computed to form predictions. We set up the fundamental model param-
5See Chapter 14 of [Gelman and Hill, 2007].
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eters so that the implied predictive distribution for the national average is fairly flat
relative to that obtained from the polling model, hence the fundamental model is useful
for learning how the national result propagates down to local level and for capturing
correlations at that level.
Our approach has close links with recent work in election forecasting. Both the funda-
mental and the polling model are multilevel regression models. [Park et al., 2004] use a
multilevel regression model and post-stratification to obtain state level estimates from
national polls6. [Lock and Gelman, 2010] use a Bayesian model to obtain a combination
of polls with forecasts from fundamentals. They merge a prior distribution, obtained
from previous election results, with polls to generate a posterior distribution over the re-
sult in each state relative to the national popular vote7. The objective of this procedure
is not to produce a forecast for the national vote but to develop a methodology that
separates the national vote from states’ relative positions. This can be very valuable for
individual state forecasts.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the challenge of forecasting elec-
toral results in the presence of emerging parties and the political developments leading
to the Congressional Elections of 2015. The choice of this example does not compromise
the general applicability of our methodology: one of the challenges in forecasting elec-
toral results is related to the fact that the allocation of seats may be very different from
the proportion of votes at national level. Section 3 describes our methodology, starting
with the fundamental model. It also describes the polls model and the synthesis of the
two models. Section 4 applies the methodology proposed in Section 3 to the Spanish
Congressional Election of 2015. Section 5 contains an evaluation of the forecasting ac-
curacy of our model compared with some alternative models recently proposed. Finally,
section 6 presents the conclusions.
2. The Spanish 2015 Congressional Election
Since the end of the dictatorship in 1977 Spanish politics was characterised by the
alternation in government of two political parties: PP (popular party, conservative) and
PSOE (socialists); see Table 1 for the main contenders and their characteristics.
Some other small and regional parties also participated in the elections but the two
largest parties accounted for 75% to 85% of the vote. The 2015 electoral campaign saw
the emergence of two new contenders at national level: Podemos (radical left) and C’s
(Ciudadanos, liberal). Podemos and C’s had no seats in previous Spanish parliaments8,
whereas in the 2015 elections they ended up with 69 and 40 respectively, out of 350 in
total. This structural change is one of the the main challenges in predicting the results of
6Multilevel structures are also relevant for some fundamental models. For instance [Elinder, 2010]
shows that regional unemployment is a factor in the support for national governments.
7For the national popular vote they use the model of [Hibbs, 2008].
8Podemos did not even exist at that time.
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Code Party Ideology 2011 Result
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol Center-left 0.288
PP Partido Popular Right-wing 0.446
Pod Podemos (including IU) Left-wing N/A
C’s Ciudadanos Center-right N/A
Table 1: Spanish parties active at national level in the 2015 elections.
the 2015 Spanish Congressional Election through standard time series regressions. This
challenge arises in any electoral contest where the emergence of new and large political
parties change the electoral environment with respect to previous elections9.
The primary challenge from a modelling perspective is that Podemos and Ciudadanos
have not inherited their electorate from a distinct previous political movement. On the
contrary, they are cannibalising parties with similar ideologies. The following sections
describe the modelling alternatives we considered and the difficulties that arise due to
the emergence of these new political parties.
The dissatisfaction of a sizeable part of the population with the measures of austerity,
initially introduced by the PSOE government in 2010, led to a popular demonstration
that occupied the centre of Madrid during several weeks. This social movement was
named 11-M since their assemblies had begun on May 11, 2011. On March 11, 2014
this movement crystallised into a new political party named Podemos, which soon had
the support, in polls, of 15% of the likely voters. Podemos was initially marketed as the
Spanish Syriza10. The leaders of Podemos came mostly from Political Science university
departments. Some of them had been members of leftist and anti-capitalist parties.
While their program in the European elections of 2014 demanded the repudiation of
public debt and the nationalisation of many industries, their positions later evolved in
order to avoid the radical left label from their early days. Podemos ended up in coalition
with IU (Izquierda Unida), the old communist party.
In addition, the conservative policies of PP, the corruption associated with conservative
politicians and the lack of internal regeneration in the party led to the birth of a new
liberal party called Ciudadanos (C’s). This party was founded in 2006 but was initially
geographically concentrated in Catalonia.
Both Podemos and C’s appear in the CIS11 surveys as of July 2014. In contrast with
9Another challenging situation for electoral forecasting in the Spanish context arose in 2004 when a
terrorist attack took place in Madrid during the last week before election day. No polls are allowed
to be conducted during that period. See [Montalvo, 2011]. In recent years, terrorist attacks have
frequently been timed to coincide with European elections. Obviously, the strategic timing of elections
can also be triggered by good economic conditions or business cycle peaks. For a recent reference see
[Voia and Ferris, 2013]
10Syriza, or the Coalition of the Radical Left, is the Greek party that won the 2015 legislative election.
11Center for Sociological Research (CIS) a publicly sponsored institution that runs the official polls. See
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Podemos, the support for Ciudadanos was only 0.9% in early 2014 but built up quickly.
In July 2015 polls showed a tie between these two new political contenders while the
support for the two largest political parties had fallen to 50%. Figure 1 depicts the
strength of different parties in each province in the 2014 European elections.
The Spanish government is appointed by the Congreso de los Diputados, which consists of
350 representatives. Each of the 52 Spanish provinces elects its own representatives from
its seat contingent according to the local electoral outcome. Thus, as in US presidential
elections, the popular vote at national level is not decisive. Therefore, the notion of
”local level” corresponds to ”province level” in the Spanish electoral system, and we will
use these two terms interchangeably in the rest of the article.
The allocation of seats at the province level is proportional, as opposed to the winner-
takes-all rule that most US states apply in presidential elections. The seat allocation
is determined by the D’Hondt method and is most easily understood in terms of the
equivalent Jefferson method, which we may express in terms of finding the market-
clearing point in the market for seats12. The Jefferson method is used to find the “price”
in votes per seat at which the “demand” for seats equals the available budget. Thus, a
simple iterative algorithm consists of increasing the price per seat until the aggregated
demand for seats equals the fixed supply. Then, each party obtains the number of seats
it can afford at the equilibrium price. Since seats are an indivisible good, a party may
just fall short of being able to buy an additional seat, with the remainder of its votes
going to waste. This will occur in every province a party runs in. Thus, given a fixed
national vote, it is preferable to have a geographically concentrated electorate. This
applies to the nationalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque country.
In the Spanish case, there is an additional rule which states that parties must obtain at
least 3% of votes in a given province to take part in the allocation. Otherwise, their votes
are disregarded. This acts as an additional penalty on smaller parties whose electorate
is spread out across the nation.
3. The proposed methodology
This section provides a high-level description of the methodology we propose for pre-
dicting electoral outcomes in the presence of strong emerging parties. Firstly, we specify
a fundamental model in the context of such parties. It predicts votes at local level from
survey and census data. Secondly, we present a methodology for the aggregation of
polls. It generates a cohesive forecast at national level. Finally, we propose a hybrid
model that synthesises the other models. Estimation of these models, out of sample
predictions for the 2015 Spanish elections, and comparisons - empirical and conceptual
- with alternative fundamental, polls and hybrid models are deferred to Section 4.
Appendix A1 for the description of the data.
12[Udina and Delicado, 2005] use data on Spanish elections to show the forecast bias of pre-electoral
polls when they convert votes into seats using D’Hondt’s rule.
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3.1. Fundamental model with emerging parties
The basic characteristics of our fundamental model are driven by the following consid-
erations:
• It should generate predictions of votes at local level, from which we will then
predict the seat allocation.
• Since these local level predictions will be aggregated to the national level, it is
statistically far more efficient (and less prone to biases) to aggregate probabilities
computed at local level and turn them into point forecasts at national level, as
opposed to providing point estimates at local level and then aggregating those.
Effectively we are computing the expectation of a non-linear function of voting
intentions at local level, and the exchange of function and expectation matters.
Working with probabilities at local level also allows us to capture important cor-
relations between outcomes at the different local units13. We therefore adopt a
probabilistic model of voting intention at local level, effectively a type of logistic
regression.
• Unlike in US Presidential Elections or previous Spanish Congressional Elections,
voter choice is fundamentally not binary in the 2015 Congressional Election. There-
fore, binary choice models are insufficient.
• The drastic change of the political scene and the emergence of strong new parties
renders historical models insufficient for prediction since there is little or no data
to train them on.
To forecast the territorial distribution of votes we use data on individual respondents
in pre-electoral surveys. In Spain, these are carried out by the government-sponsored
research centre CIS14. They allow us to estimate the relationship between geographical
and demographic characteristics and voters’ choice. The downside of these data sets is
that the sample size in some provinces is small, leading to noisy estimates. Furthermore,
their sample may be biased, and in any case our results should depend as little as possible
on any potential bias due to non-representative sampling on the part of CIS.
We correct for both these issues by stratifying the respondents into disjoint ”strata”; each
”stratum” is a combination of different categorical variables, e.g. ”man” (in the variable
”sex”), in the age group 36-55 (in the variable ”age group”), with tertiary schooling
(in the variable ”educational level”), employed (in the variable ”employment status”)
who lives in a small community (in the variable ”community size”) in the province of
Albacete (in the variable ”province”)”. Say there are N such strata (there are precisely
8424 in our specific application); and let n be a specific stratum. We model the survey
response counts sn of a stratum n, which is the vector of counts in that stratum for the
13See [Silver, 2017]
14See Appendix A1.
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votes to each of the available parties, through a multinomial distribution:
sn|µn ∼ Multinomial(µn) (1)
where µn is the vector of probabilities that a person belonging to such stratum votes for
each of the available parties. From the most recent census data, we estimate wi,n, the
frequency of people in province i that belong to stratum n; we then estimate the vector
of probabilities of voting for each party in province i as the weighted average
N∑
n=1
µnwi,n.
This formula stems from the following basic decomposition:
Prob[vote party l | province i] =∑
n
Prob[vote party l | stratum n ] Prob[stratum n | province i]
This approach is known as post-stratification, see e.g. [Park et al., 2004].
The model we use for µn is a multinomial logistic regression. In the case of two competing
parties it becomes a logistic regression model for the probability of voting for one of the
two parties given the stratum. For the multi-party setting we are interested in, let the
vector µn contain elements µn(l), which is the probability of voting for party l, among
l = 1, . . . , L competing parties. Then, the model becomes
µn(l) =
efn,l∑L
m=1 e
fn,m
where fn,l is a linear combination of dummy variables for the different levels of the
categorical variables that define the stratum:
fn,l = αl +
∑
k
β(k,jk[n],l) (2)
where jk[n] is the level of factor k that corresponds to stratum n for party l. The
Appendix A2 and A3 contain details on the model and provide the multi-level formulae
that define the model rigorously15.
Therefore, we fit a main effects ANOVA model where each level of every categorical
factor gets a different parameter. Additionally, we allow these parameters to differ for
each party. The abundance of parameters calls for some type of regularisation, and we
opt for a Bayesian multilevel approach, whereby the parameters associated with a factor
are drawn from a common prior; see Appendix A416.
15We follow the standard practice of setting all coefficients of the pivot category (“other parties”) to 0
for simpler interpretation.
16[Stegmueller, 2013] concludes that when using multilevel models the Bayesian approach is more robust
and generates more conservative tests than the frequentist approach.
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3.2. Polls model
3.2.1. An explanatory ANOVA polls model
Polls are published from a few months before until shortly before election day17 and
give estimates of voting sentiment for each of the parties at national level. The simplest
possibility to aggregate polls into a single prediction would be just to average the latest
period (one week, two weeks, one month). This local averaging might be carried out
using overlapping or non-overlapping windows of time. Forecasting can then be done
only under the assumption that there is not going to be a change in public opinion from
that time period to the election day.
This local averaging implicitly assumes that polls around a period in time are inde-
pendent and identically distributed around the true voting sentiment. However, this is
assumption is unlike to hold for a variety of reasons18:
• Polls by the same pollster may exhibit the same systematic bias across elections.
For example, some pollsters are subject to political influence, which may lead them
to bias their estimates systematically. This is known as the house effect19.
• Polls preceding the same election may suffer from systematic bias across pollsters.
This may be due to common methodological flaws and pollsters manipulating their
polls to conform with the fold. We will call this an election effect20.
• Some pollsters’ methodology may be superior, leading to lower error variance.
Additionally, polls are carried out on samples of varying size21.
• Subsequent polls may be trending up or down. We will refer to this as trending.
22
We return to those later, after we have estimated our proposed model in section 4, to
show the evidence our data provide for each of those.
We can formalise these components. Let pk denote a poll’s prediction. Recall that in a
multi-party system we have a vector of predictions, one for each competing party. Poll
k takes place at some time t[k]23, and let vt[k] be the election result corresponding to
poll k, i.e. the result of the election which this poll refers to. As earlier, let pk(l) and
17In Spain a week before, but in Andorra it is allowed to publish polls regarding the Spanish elections
up to a day before.
18In fact [Shirani-Merh et al., 2018], in their analysis of 7,040 polls, show that there is a substantial
election-level bias and excess of variance with respect to the variance calculated using the standard
random sampling assumption.
19See [Silver, 2017] and [Shirani-Merh et al., 2018]
20See [Silver, 2017]
21See [Shirani-Merh et al., 2018]
22See [Lock and Gelman, 2010] for evidence of trending close to election day and [Linzer, 2013] for a
stochastic trending model.
23This is standard multilevel notation. See Appendix A2 for details.
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vt[k](l) refer to the predictions and actual result for the lth party. We build a multi-level
analysis of variance model for decomposing the error pk(l)− vt[k](l) as the sum of four
terms:
• a time-invariant bias of the pollster that has produced the poll (house effect)
• a pollster invariant bias that applies to each election separately (election effect)
• a linear trend in time, with a coefficient that is allowed to vary across elections
but is common to all pollsters (trending)
• a poll-specific idiosyncratic error that could be due to differences in methodologies
across pollsters and sampling variability.
Additionally, we learn the correlations between the idiosyncratic errors for different
parties, and we allow the corresponding matrices to vary by pollster. Similarly, the effects
that refer to different parties are allowed to be correlated, e.g. the house effects of a
pollster for different parties. Again, the abundance of parameters calls for regularisation,
and again we opt for a Bayesian approach to this multilevel model. All in all, the poll
errors are modelled as a multivariate Gaussian distribution, the mean component and
the covariance of which are implied by the decomposition described above24.
(pk − vt[k]) ∼ N(γj[k] + δt[k] + dkt[k],Σj[k]) (3)
where γj is the time-invariant bias of pollster j, δt is the pollster-invariant bias in
election t, dk corresponds to how many days before the election poll k was published
and t[k] is the pollster-invariant strength of the trend in a given election. t[k] decays
as election day approaches, but δt applies to all polls until the election
25. As with the
fundamental model we use the Bayesian multilevel paradigm to deal with the abundance
of parameters and refer to Appendix A4 for details on the prior distributions we have
used.
In summary, we build an ANOVA model to explain the errors pk(l)−vt[k](l). From this
perspective, this is not a predictive model. Its purpose is to understand the importance
and relative magnitude of different sources of variability in published polls.
3.2.2. Turning the explanatory into a predictive polls model
The model we propose in the previous section implies a joint density for all the available
polls in a given election conditional on the election result:
Prob[available polls | new election result]
24Polls of different pollsters in the same election are dependent through their dependence on the election
effect, polls of the same pollster in different elections are dependent through their dependence on the
common house effect, etc.
25See also [Montalvo et al., 2016]. The model in [Shirani-Merh et al., 2018] includes a bias for each poll
that is allowed to change linearly over time and a variance term that captures residual variability.
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This density is obtained through the linear transformation
poll = result + poll error
and the model for the poll error we have built already. However, what we need is the
”inverse probability”
Prob[new election result | available polls ]
which we obtain by applying Bayes’ theorem, as
Prob[new election result | available polls ] ∝
Prob[available polls | new election result] Prob[new election result].
Therefore, to get a predictive model we need a prior model to be combined with the
explanatory model we have built. The approach followed here is an instance of what
is known as inverse regression, a popular approach to predictive modelling with high-
dimensional data26. In the hybrid model we propose in the sequel we get the fundamental
model to serve as a prior. A simpler alternative, which is good enough for the purpose
of predicting national average results but not seat allocation, is to use a uniform prior
on the result, in which case
Prob[new election result | available polls ] ∝
Prob[available polls | new election result],
the latter seen as a function of ”new election result”. Effectively, we exploit the symmetry
of the Gaussian distribution in our errors model to create the predictive model as:
result = poll + poll error
The details on how to generate predictions using this predictive model are included in
the Appendix A4.
3.3. The hybrid model
The basis of our hybrid model is the conditional probability we obtained in the previous
section:
Prob[new election result | available polls ] ∝
Prob[available polls | new election result] Prob[new election result].
We use the explanatory polls model to produce the first density and the fundamental
model based on surveys to produce the second. Operationally, we carry out the following
procedure:
26See [Cook and Ni, 2005]
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1. We produce a simulations of local results according to the fundamental model; let
one such simulation be vi,s for i = 1, . . . , I, where i indicates local district and s
the simulation count.
2. For each simulation we aggregate result at national level to obtain a simulation of
vs.
3. Provide weight to each simulation according to
Ws = Prob[available polls | vs ]
which is computed from the explanatory polls model.
4. Produce predictions by computing weighted averages∑S
s=1 g(v1,s, . . . ,vI,s)Ws∑S
s=1Ws
where g is a function of interest of local results. We are particularly interested in the
function that, implied by D’Hondt’s method, maps local level results to national level
seat allocations for each party. Apart from point estimates we can also produce predictive
intervals in a similar way.
In the implementation described above one wants to make S, the total number of simu-
lations, as large as possible, the limiting factor is the computational budget described in
Section 3.2.2. In Section 4 we show graphical and numerical evidence that the resulting
inference on the national-level result is dominated by the polls model; actually we devise
a metric according to which we obtain that less than 35% of the hybrid model inference
is driven by the prior. In the appendix we explain how we get the fundamental model
to have minor influence on the hybrid prediction of national averages.
3.4. The computational approach underpinning the methodology
The fundamental model and the polls model are ANOVA-type models, formulated as
Bayesian multilevel models as described in some detail in the appendix A3 and A4.
We follow a fairly standard specification of the prior distributions for these models, as
for example explained in [Gelman et al., 2006, Gelman and Hill, 2007]. We implement
these models in Stan ([Carpenter et al., 2017]), an open-source platform for performing
full Bayesian statistical inference, which carries out Hamiltonian Markov chain Monte
Carlo sampling from the corresponding posterior distributions.
Behind the scenes of the procedure described for the hybrid model, we use importance
sampling27 to explore the distribution
Prob[new election result | available polls & survey data ],
27See Chapter 2 of [Liu, 2001].
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and a sampling-based approach to carry out the Bayesian updating28.
4. Results for the 2015 Spanish congressional election
In this section we apply the methodology discussed previously to the case of the Spanish
Congressional Election of 2015. Before 2015, the national outcome was highly predictable
from fundamentals and past results. For example, Figure 2 (left) plots the electoral result
of the 2000 election versus that of the 1996 election for the PP (blue) and the PSOE
(red) in each province of Spain, numbered according to the standard postcode coding of
Spanish provinces. The picture is similar in other elections prior to 2015. In particular,
the positions of provinces relative to the national average are highly predictable. This
manifests itself through regression lines that are almost parallel the 45o line. Historical
models typically include predictors such as unemployment rates, growth of personal
disposable income, lagged electoral outcomes, presidential incumbency, regional trends,
presidential approval, presidential home advantage (or the corresponding adjustment for
party leader home province), partisanship or ideology of each state/district, etc.29
However, the usefulness and predictive ability of historical models for the 2015 Congres-
sional Election is questionable. To start with, such a model cannot provide predictions
for parties with no competitive participation in previous elections. Additionally, even
when making predictions for the traditional political players in Spain, it is unlikely that
the model estimated under a completely different political environment would have any
applicability in this new situation. Figure 2 (right) shows that the pattern observed in
past elections has indeed been broken in the 2015 elections.
4.1. Learning the fundamental model
To train the fundamental model for the 2015 Spanish Congressional Election, we use the
2015 CIS pre-electoral survey30. This results in a sample of about 17,452 respondents.
We drop all respondents that did not report their voting intention from the sample,
which amounts to assuming that their voting intention data is missing at random. We
include factors for the province, size of the municipality, gender, age, education and
labour market activity of the respondent. The categories of each variables are described
in Table A.1 of Appendix A1. The results of the estimation of the Bayesian multinomial
logit model are summarised in Figure 3.31.
In practice, because responses may not accurately reflect behaviour at the voting booth,
and because of the possibility of shifts between the survey and the election date, we
28See [Smith and Gelfand, 1992]
29See, for instance, [Campbell, 1992, Campbell, 2008], [Gelman and King, 1993], [Klarner, 2008],
[Fair, 2009] or [Hummel and Rothschild, 2014].
30These surveys already contain questions about the two new parties.
31We run 4 chains in Stan with 2000 iterations each, the first half of which we discard.
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inflate the uncertainty about the constants α, reflecting uncertainty about the national
vote. In practice, this corresponds to multiplying MCMC draws of α by 1.532.
To interpret the estimates, notice that:
• Since the model is overparameterised, some parameters are weakly identified. This
manifests in wide marginal distributions. These overstate uncertainty since the
parameters are highly correlated: once one of the parameters has been fixed, the
uncertainty resolves.
• As we fix the parameters of the pivot party (essentially consisting of regional
parties) to 0, all estimates must be interpreted relative to these parties. Therefore,
a positive intercept estimate for PSOE implies that the average respondent is more
likely to vote for PSOE than regional parties.
The province effects in Figure 3 indicate that PP has the most variable territorial distri-
bution, while Podemos is fairly constant. PSOE is strong in Andalucia and Extremadura
and fairly weak in Catalonia and the Basque Country. PP has its strongest base in Castile
and Murcia, but is extremely weak in Catalonia and the Basque Country.
As to the other factors, Podemos and C’s are slightly more urban while the other parties’
support does not vary along that dimension. PSOE and PP mostly appeal to uneducated
voters. Labour market activity is likely irrelevant after controlling for other factors.
Figure 4 illustrates point predictions of the fundamental model after post-stratification
and how they compare against the actual 2015 election results.
4.2. Learning the pollster model
We use the pollster model we have described in the 2015 Spanish elections. We work
with the results of 157 electoral polls published before the Congressional Elections of
1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2011. This set corresponds to the subset of polls published
up to 30 days before a Congressional Election.
Exploratory analysis reveals that the uncertainty about the election result close to elec-
tion day by far exceeds the sampling uncertainty33. Rolling averages, like the ones
depicted in Figure 5, do not provide a direct measure of uncertainty, which is essential
to building a probabilistic model. Averaging multiple polls does not eliminate the ex-
cess uncertainty. Furthermore, we sometimes observe sharp trending close to election
day, even after prolonged periods of stability. Following (and extrapolating) the trend
usually takes us closer to the election result than simple averaging. Figure 6 shows for
the 2015 Spanish elections how the declared margin of error in the polls, usually given
as the inverse of the square root of the sample size, tends to underestimate the true
uncertainty. Furthermore, using a linear trend brings us closer to the election result.
32The choice of that factor is partially motivated by computational constraints that arise when combining
the fundamental model with the polls.
33This result is also supported by the evidence provided in [Shirani-Merh et al., 2018].
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Figures 7, 8 and 9 depict the marginal distribution of pollster bias, election bias and
election trend respectively34. Estimated pollster biases β are generally consistent with
political expedience. For example, the pollster Sigma dos, which mostly provides polls
for the right-leaning newspaper El Mundo, has a consistent bias in favour of the Popular
Party. Invymark, the pollster selected by left-leaning TV station La Sexta, shows a
consistent bias in favour of the Socialist party. By contrast, the polls run by the CIS,
the public pollster, do not show any specific party bias. Election biases δt are large, with
pollsters collectively missing the PSOE-PP differential by 7 percentage points, calling
into question the quality of Spanish polling and the predictability of Spanish elections
in general. Estimated trend effects t are large in many elections, which confirms that
some trend adjustment is necessary even within the last 30 days. Finally, election biases
seem to coincide in sign and magnitude with trends, especially in the 2004 elections, but
we deem our sample to be too small to draw further conclusions.
4.3. Synthesised predictions
Figure 10 shows how the synthesis operates in the 2015 election. As in Bayesian updat-
ing for normal distributions, the posterior’s location is a compromise between prior and
likelihood while inverse variance is approximately additive. Aggregating polls substan-
tially improves the PP and Podemos prediction even though the C’s forecast benefits
less. The benefits of aggregation are limited when pollsters show correlated errors due to
herding or common methodological shortcomings. Since our framework explicitly allows
for such a scenario, we manage to avoid undue confidence and preserve some probability
mass at the outcome. We observe that the location of the predictive distribution over
the national vote is largely driven by the polls model. While it is difficult to obtain
quantitative importance weights for prior and likelihood in general Bayesian models,
such weights exist for the case where both are Gaussian. When approximating prior and
posterior by Gaussian distributions, we find a weight of 35% for the fundamental model
in forming synthesised beliefs for the national average.
Figure 11 shows the predictive seat distribution for the largest five parties. The result
is close to the predictive mode for PSOE, PP and Podemos, while the result of C’s
is in the left tail of the predictive distribution. The predictive distribution that we
generated the figure from may also be used to evaluate the probability of other events
on said distribution. Examples include the probability of a party coming in first or
the probability of a coalition of parties achieving a parliamentary majority. The figure
exhibits some features that illustrate the benefits of our strategy to model seat allocation
explicitly:
• PSOE and PP are granted more seats than their national vote forecast implies.
This is due to the rural bias of the provincial seat allocation.
34Hyperpriors are set in accordance with Stan reference priors. We sample from the models using Stan,
running 4 chains with 2000 iterations each, the first half of which we discard.
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• There are long right tails in the marginals for Podemos and C’s even though
national vote forecasts are symmetric. These are a consequence of the D’Hondt
allocation process that delivers increasing benefits to scale.
• The seat forecasts for PSOE and PP are wider than they are for Podemos and C’s
even though uncertainty when predicting the national vote is similar.
Figure 12 shows point predictions versus actual results and is directly comparable to
Figure 4. Both figures reveal that the CIS survey data is miscalibrated, i.e. it predicts
a variance between provinces that is too large. The phenomenon applies to all parties
and it is visible before and after post-stratification. Predictions could be recalibrated
by shrinking all forecasts towards a party’s national mean, but this would require that
the phenomenon persists between election. Our analysis of the electoral barometers
published by CIS every trimester confirms that the miscalibration is persistent, but
unfortunately the extent of the phenomenon seems to vary from one survey to the next.
5. Predictive evaluation against alternative models
While the primary appeal of our model lies in its ability to flexibly incorporate polling
data into a coherent spatio-temporal probabilistic forecast, we also intended to deliver
an improved point forecast relative to more straightforward approaches. In this section
we elaborate several alternative models for each component as well as the hybrid model,
and we show the gains in predictive accuracy achieved through our methodology. In
keeping with the spirit of the paper, we also evaluate separately the two components
of our hybrid model, the fundamental and the polls model, in isolation against their
respective alternative models. Since many alternative models are limited to giving a
point prediction of the national-level result of the parties, we only evaluate our model
based on such point predictions, keeping in mind that our main object of interest is
the distribution of seats. Additionally, in order to provide a fair comparison with other
models, we only consider the prediction of the two traditional parties, avoiding emergent
parties. However, we should notice that our modelling strategy is mostly informed by
the need to accommodate the participation of new parties in political elections.
5.1. Selecting alternative models
As discussed in Section 1, the prediction of elections usually rests on the specification of a
fundamental model or the aggregation of the results of electoral polls and other sources of
information. Recent literature on election forecasting also resorts to some combination of
prediction from fundamental variables and averages of polls. In this section we describe
some popular election forecasting models and compare their predictive performance with
our proposal.
We can specify an alternative fundamental model as a regression model that predicts
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the party’s result from the growth of GDP per capita during the preceding year and its
result in the previous election35:
result = β0 + β1 × lagged result + β2 × gdp growth + residual (4)
We consider separate versions of that model for predicting the national vote share and
the log number of parliamentary seats won by the incumbent party.
We construct an alternative specification for the polls’ model as a linear regression model
that predicts the proportion of votes for a party as a simple average of all national level
polls published up to 30 days before election day36:
result = γ0 + γ1 × polls average + residual (5)
Finally, the alternative hybrid model combines the predictors of the fundamental model
and the polls in a single regression following [Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville, 2016] and
[Lewis-Beck et al., 2016]:
result = δ0 + δ1 × lagged result + δ2 × gdp growth
+ δ3 × polls average + residual (6)
Analogously, as we already pointed out, we define a model for the main challenging
party, which is either PP or PSOE in the set of available elections.
5.2. Estimating the alternative models
We estimate the parameters of the alternative models through ordinary least squares
(OLS). The following numbers pertain to the incumbent model trained for predicting
the 2015 election, i.e. the model that includes all elections up to 2015 in its training
set. This matches the training set that we used to train our proposed model. For the
fundamental model, we obtain the following parameter estimates:
votes = 0.306− 0.054× lagged votes + 0.035× gdp growth + residual (7)
log seats = 5.994− 0.255× log lagged seats + 0.108× gdp growth + residual (8)
For the polls model, we obtain the following parameter estimates:
votes = 0.023 + 0.943× polls average + residual (9)
log seats = 3.846 + 3.007× polls average + residual (10)
35This specification is similar to [Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville, 2016] and [Lewis-Beck et al., 2016] but
uses the results in the previous election instead of the government approval rate, since we want to
show the predictive ability of our model not only for the incumbent but also for the main challenging
party.
36This specification is also similar to [Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville, 2016] and [Lewis-Beck et al., 2016]
who set the predictions of the polls’ model to the aggregate median vote intention. In our case the
median and the mean are very similar and, since many standard models like [Graefe, 2015] use the
mean, we decided to use the mean.
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Alternative Our model
Election Party Outcome Estimate Residual Estimate Residual
2015 PSOE 0.220 0.471 -0.251 0.228 0.008
2015 PP 0.287 0.331 -0.044 0.244 0.042
2016 PSOE 0.226 0.143 0.082 0.223 0.003
2016 PP 0.330 0.443 -0.112 0.262 0.067
Table 2: Predictive accuracy of the proposed fundamental vote forecasting model com-
pared to the benchmark model. Predictions are made out of sample. Both
models use the same set of elections for training.
Alternative Our model
Election Party Outcome Estimate Residual Estimate Residual
2015 PSOE 0.220 0.277 -0.057 0.213 0.007
2015 PP 0.287 0.281 0.005 0.293 -0.006
2016 PSOE 0.226 0.229 0.002 0.216 0.010
2016 PP 0.330 0.303 0.027 0.302 0.028
Table 3: Predictive accuracy of the proposed polls vote forecasting model compared to
the benchmark model. Predictions are made out of sample. Both models use
the same set of elections for training.
For the synthetic model, we obtain the following parameter estimates:
votes = 0.429− 0.783× lagged votes + 0.011× gdp growth
+ 0.649× polls average + residual (11)
log seats = 8.058− 0.743× log lagged seats + 0.062× gdp growth
+ 1.468× polls average + residual (12)
Initially, we check the performance of the two components of the hybrid model. First of
all, as shown in Table 2, our fundamental model outperforms the alternative fundamental
model, giving errors of .042/.008 compared to .044/.251 in 2015 for the incumbent and
the main challenging party (PP/PSOE). For the 2016 election our model delivers even
smaller errors than the alternative model. We should keep in mind that the primary
goal of the fundamental model is to provide local information on party strength, and
therefore the national level point estimates are of secondary importance. See Table 2 for
all the estimates and outcomes.
Secondly, the alternative polls’ model has an error of .005/.057. in 2015, whereas our
pollster model has an error of .006/.007 (PP/PSOE). Thus, the quality of point estimates
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Alternative Our model
Election Party Outcome Estimate Residual Estimate Residual
2015 PSOE 0.220 0.607 -0.387 0.203 0.017
2015 PP 0.287 0.273 0.013 0.275 0.012
2016 PSOE 0.226 0.261 -0.035 0.212 0.014
2016 PP 0.330 0.392 -0.062 0.293 0.037
Table 4: Predictive accuracy of the proposed hybrid vote forecasting model compared to
the benchmark model. Predictions are made out of sample. Both models use
the same set of elections for training.
is slightly superior in our model. Simple polls averages predict similarly well with errors
of .012/.009. See Table 3 for estimates and outcomes37. In this particular case it seems
that modelling the biases of the polls does not provide a large advantage over other
methods but, in general, it could substantially improve the forecasting. For instance,
the simple average would have been inadequate in elections where polls exhibit strong
trending during the last month. Our proposed polls model accounts for such trending
and should yield better point predictions in those situations.
The results of the comparison of the predictive performance of our model and the alter-
native hybrid model are presented in Table 4 (proportion of votes) and Table 5 (seats).
Our hybrid model outperforms the alternative model in the 2015 and the 2016 election
with respect to predicting the national vote share. The comparison of the forecast with
respect to our pollster model leads to less conclusive results. In fact, in this case, our
pollster model seems to work a bit better than the hybrid model in predicting the na-
tional vote. However, as we have already argued in previous sections, the most likely
advantage of our methodology is related with the forecasting of parliamentary seats. Ta-
ble 5 shows that our forecast using the hybrid model reduces the error down to 2/14 seats
from about 17/47 (PP/PSOE) of the alternative hybrid model in the 2015 elections38.
The large improvement in the performance of our model in the prediction of the seats in
the parliament is consistent with the objectives of the specification of our fundamental
model. As we discussed previously, our fundamental model tries to get information on
the geographical distribution of votes, which greatly improves the prediction of seats
given the very nonlinear nature of the relationship between national proportion of votes
and seat allocation.
37Similar conclusions apply for the 2016 elections.
38The results of our seat allocation forecasting model are also better than the ones produced by the
alternative model in the 2016 election.
19
Alternative Our model
Election Party Outcome Estimate Residual Estimate Residual
2015 PSOE 90.00 137.57 -47.57 75.47 14.53
2015 PP 123.00 105.65 17.34 125.32 -2.31
2016 PSOE 85.00 112.97 -27.97 79.72 5.28
2016 PP 137.00 165.46 -28.46 119.11 17.88
Table 5: Predictive accuracy of the proposed hybrid seats forecasting model compared
to the benchmark model. Predictions are made out of sample. Both models
use the same set of elections for training.
6. Conclusions
This paper proposed a methodology to forecast electoral outcomes using the result of
the combination of a fundamental model and a model-based aggregation of polls. We
propose a Bayesian hierarchical structure for the fundamental model that synthesises
data at the provincial, regional and national level. We use a Bayesian strategy to com-
bine the fundamental model with the information coming for recent polls. This model
can naturally be updated every time new information, for instance a new poll, becomes
available. This methodology is well suited to deal with increasingly frequent situations
in which new political parties enter an electoral competition, although our approach is
general enough to accommodate any other electoral situation. We illustrate the advan-
tages of our method using the 2015 Spanish Congressional Election in which two new
parties ended up receiving 30% of the votes. We compare the predictive performance of
our model versus alternative models. In general the predictions of our model outperform
the alternative specifications, including hybrid models that combine fundamental and
polls models. Our predictions are, in relative terms, particularly accurate in predicting
the seats obtained by each political party.
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Figure 1: Map of Spanish provinces colored by strongest party in the 2014 European
elections and degree of dominance, darker shades corresponding to stronger
dominance. Legend: PSOE (red), PP (blue), Podemos+IU (purple), others
(gray).
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Figure 2: Scatterplot of lagged vote share vs current vote share in 2000 (left) and 2015
(right) relative to previous result, plus robust linear regression line. Legend:
PSOE (red), PP (blue). In grey the 45o line. The labels refer to the INE
province code.
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Figure 3: βjl marginal distributions (sentiment model level coefficients): median (point),
50 percent credibility interval (thick line) and 95 percent credibility interval
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Figure 4: Scatterplot of post-stratified point estimates vs. outcomes and regression line.
Statistics are listed in the usual party order. MSE is computed as the average
squared difference between the mean prediction and the result over provinces.
Legend: PSOE (red), PP (blue), Podemos+IU (purple), C’s (orange).
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Figure 5: Polling before the general election of 2015, with LOESS smoother. Legend:
Legend: PSOE (red), PP (blue), Podemos (purple), C’s (orange). The election
day is marked by the vertical solid line.
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(OLS), the dashed line is the election result and the error bars correspond to
the margin of error reported by the pollster.
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Figure 7: γj marginal distributions (pollster bias): median (point), 50 percent credibility
interval (thick line) and 95 percent credibility interval (thin line). Positive
values imply that the pollster is overestimating.
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Figure 8: δt marginal distributions (election bias): median (point), 50 percent credibility
interval (thick line) and 95 percent credibility interval (thin line). Positive
values imply that the pollster is overestimating.
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Figure 9: t marginal distributions (election trend): median (point), 50 percent credibil-
ity interval (thick line) and 95 percent credibility interval (thin line). Positive
values imply that polls are trending down.
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Figure 10: Predictive national vote distribution: fundamental model (red), polls model
(green), synthesis (blue). The dots represent the election result.
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Figure 11: Predictive seat distribution and election result (black dot).
A. Appendix
A.1. Data
The data on the election outcomes come from the Spanish Department of Home Affairs.
For the fundamental model, we use the 2015 CIS (CIS is the Spanish National Center
for Sociological Research) pre-electorals (CIS study number 3117). The study is openly
available on http://www.cis.es/ and includes 17452 respondents. Data was collected
from October 27th to November 16th, 2015.
To train the polls model, we use 157 polls published within 30 days of the 1996, 2000,
2004, 2008 and 2011 Congressional Elections. Furthermore, to generate predictions, we
use 51 polls published within 30 days of the 2015 Congressional Election.
A.2. Hierarchical modelling notation
Hierarchical modelling notation is a convenient way of describing models that include
a lot of categorical variables as regressors. Our hierarchical modelling notation follows
the standard set by [Gelman and Hill, 2007] in Data analysis using regression and mul-
tilevel/hierarchical models.
Consider this brief explanation of the notation. Let {1, . . . , I} index a set of observations
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Figure 12: Scatterplot of point predictions vs. outcomes and regression line. Statistics
are listed in the usual party order. MSE is computed as the average squared
difference between the mean prediction and the result over provinces. Legend:
Legend: PSOE (red), PP (blue), Podemos+IU (purple), C’s (orange).
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Factor Code Levels
Voting Intention 1 PSOE
2 PP
3 Podemos, En Comu´ Podem, En Marea, IU
4 Ciudadanos
5 Others
Province 1-52 INE Province Code
Municipality Population 1 less than 2000 inh.
2 between 2000 and 10000 inh.
3 more than 10000 inh.
Gender 1 Male
2 Female
Age 1 18 to 35 y.o.
2 36 to 55 y.o.
3 more than 56 y.o.
Education 1 Primary or less
2 Secondary
3 Tertiary
Activity 1 Employed
2 Unemployed
3 Out of the labour force
Table A.1: Factors used in the fundamental model and their categories. These categori-
cal features define 8424 distinct strata, or 162 distinct strata per province
and {1, . . . , J} be the indices of the levels of a categorical factor. Then, the notation j[i]
refers to a map {1, . . . , I} 7→ {1, . . . , J} which links each observation to its respective
factor level. For instance, if the factor is gender, male has index 1, female index 2 and
observation 1 is female, then j[1] = 2.
If β is the vector of coefficients pertaining to the levels of some factor, we can use hier-
archical modelling notation to retrieve components of that vector. In keeping with our
example, βj[1] = β2 is the coefficient of the gender of observation 1, which is equivalently
the coefficient of the female level of the gender factor.
We may express this equivalently using dummy variables, but hierarchical modelling
notation tends to be more concise. For example, consider a simple regression model
with one categorical factor. In dummy notation, we write yi = β0 +
∑
j βjxij + i. In
hierarchical modelling notation, we just write yi = β0 + βj[i] + i.
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A.3. The fundamental model
In the following section, let θ refer to the set of unknowns. We model the survey response
counts sn ∈ NL of a stratum n through a multinomial logit model:
sn|θ ∼ Multinomial(µn(θ)) (13)
µn(θ) = softmax
[
α+
∑
k
β(k,jk[i])
]
(14)
where k indexes the factors through which we define the strata (e.g. location, gender,
education) and jk indexes the possible levels of factor k (e.g. male, female, unreported
for factor gender). Thus, β(k,jk) is the coefficient pertaining to factor k and level jk, and
jk[n] is the level of factor k that corresponds to stratum n. The operator softmax is the
multivariate generalisation of the logistic function.
We pool each factor’s levels to a common prior:
α ∼ N(0, I), β(k,jk)|σk ∼ N(0, (diagσk)2), σk
iid∼ half-N(1) (15)
While the coefficients are identified due to the prior, we stick to the standard identifia-
bility constraint of setting all coefficients of the residual party to zero. Then, coefficients
may be interpreted as changing the response probabilities relative to the residual party.
A.4. The polls model
In the following section, let ψ refer to the set of unknowns except for vt, i.e. the
result of the t-th election. All vectors have dimension equal to the number of parties
minus 1. Dropping the last dimension is necessary to ensure that the distribution is
non-degenerate. We assume that polls are generated by the following process:
pk|(ψ,vt[k]) ∼ N(vt[k] + γj[k] + δt[k] + dkt[k],Σj[k]) (16)
where γj is the time-invariant bias of pollster j, δt is the pollster-invariant bias in election
t, dk corresponds to how many days before the election poll k was published and t is the
pollster-invariant strength of the trend in a given election. dkt[k] vanishes as election
day approaches, but δt applies to all polls until the election.
We set the following priors on the random effects:
γj |ψ ∼ N(0,Σγ), δt|ψ ∼ N(0,Σδ), t|ψ ∼ N(0,Σ) (17)
If we integrate out the random effects, any two polls k 6= k′ have joint distribution
characterised by the following mean and covariance functions:
m(k) = vt[k] (18)
C(k, k′) = 1(t[k]=t[k′])(Σδ + dkdk′Σ) + 1(j[k]=j[k′]) Σγ + 1(k=k′) Σj[k] (19)
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Accordingly, we may express the marginal polls model as a Gaussian process:
pk|(vt[k],Σγ ,Σδ,Σ,Σj[k]) ∼ GP(m(k),C(k, k′)) (20)
The model specified up to now defines a likelihood of polls given an upcoming election
result vt∗ . We may complete the specification by adding the flat prior
p(vt∗) ∝ 1 (21)
thus allowing us to sample from the joint posterior of parameters and upcoming election
result. Alternatively, we may use said likelihood to weight samples from some other
prior over the upcoming election, e.g. our fundamental model.
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